
How will tourism security change in a post-Isis world?

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Abstract

History is a look back and never forward, but often lessons from the past can help us avoid the same mistakes in the future. With history as our guide, we know that ever since Cain murdered Abel human beings have had a violent streak. We also know that the highly globalized and interconnected world filled with technology means that communication is not only easier for the traveler but also for those who seek to destroy the tourism and travel industry. Modernity means not only great opportunities for peace but also as we learned in World War II, enhanced opportunities for human destruction. Tourism in a post-ISIS world will need not only highly skilled professionals but the realization that we are once again faced with the challenge first put forth by Moses as the Children of Israel finished their journey to the promised land: Behold I put before you both life and death, choose life! It will be our responsibility to make the correct choice and to choose life over acts of terrorism.

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Introduction

The March 2019 Massacre at the Christchurch New Zealand Mosques (BBC) appears to be part of a series of attacks against religious institutions throughout the world. These institutions, belonging to a variety of faiths, have suffered from deadly attacks that in many cases appear to be, or similar to, terrorist attacks. It is still an open question as to whether we should classify these attacks as hate crimes or acts terrorism. In reality, the line between hate crimes and acts of terrorism is imprecise and certainly, the definition is less important than these horrific acts (Gibbs 1989; Primoratz 1990; 1997). Generally speaking, all acts of terrorism are based on some form of hate, but not all hate crimes are acts of terrorism. This distinction is important not only for reasons of defense but also from the perspective of the tourism industry (Korstanje 2018). From the perspective of the tourism industry, the long-term consequences of a hate crime might be different from that of terrorism (Korstanje, Raj & Griffin 2018).

Attacks against religious institutions are not new (Somnez 1998; Tarlow 2006). These attacks reach deep into history, from the pogroms of 14th and 15th century Spain to 20th century Nazi Germany, too late 20th-century terrorist group planned attacks against churches, mosques and Buddhist religious sites especially in the Middle East and in what was Taliban held areas. The current wave of attacks on religious institutions, however, has a different feel to it. This new sub-genre of attacks on religious institutions is somewhat different from other forms of attacks against religious institutions. Past attacks had some form of political motive. Thus, medieval Catholic attacks in Inquisitional Spain were aimed at forcing Jews to convert to Catholicism even against their will. Pre-Final Solution German attacks on synagogues during the Nazi period were intended to frighten Jews so that they would leave the country, and attacks in the Middle East were meant to rid the region of non-Muslims. These earlier attacks were government, or official agency, sponsored and fit into a particular political or religious ideology. It is not clear if these current attacks fit into this same category.

Is this new form of hate crimes different from not only events in the recent past but in the far distant past? In this latest wave of violence, it appears that single individual (or small groups of individuals) seeks publicity through murder. The media often report these acts as “lone wolf” attacks, but is this reporting true or should we view these attacks as part of a new sui generis movement? Other than an agenda of hate for hate’s sake, the media report that these attacks do not appear to have a political platform. Instead, the perpetrators are presented as loners who tend to feel threatened by people who are “different” from themselves. This subgenre of mass shootings has occurred across religious lines. Thus, we see a similar form of hate attacks against synagogues, attacks against both white and black protestant churches, Sikh temples, and mosques. There does not appear to be a geographic pattern to these attacks either. They do, however, fit into Toffler’s concept of “de-massification” (Toffler & Alvin 1990). We can understand this term in the following way: “Some of the key elements of a de-massified attack are that cells do not need to communicate with each other. Instead, sharing a common ideology of hate, they simply self generate acts of violence, and the goal is not only to hurt but to receive publicity in the hurting” (Tarlow, 2009). This de-massified form of violence helps to explain the reasons that these attacks have occurred in both urban and rural settings and against multiple religious ideologies. In a like manner, gun laws do not matter to the perpetrators. Some of these tragedies have occurred in locations with strict gun control regulations, and others in locations where gun control is loose. Those seeking to attack religious institutions know that these institutions are soft targets where those bent on hateful actions can be assured that they will have minimal physical opposition. Often the perpetrators leave no record, other than hateful diatribes, for their actions. Tarlow’s (2009) essay on “Western Religions and Terrorism: Do They Interact?” summarizes this unrelenting hate, now often being directed against houses of worship when he states: “What we do know is that men and women will die for an ideology and that the more certain they are that their belief system is correct, the more willing they are to die for it and to destroy those who oppose it” (Tarlow, 2009). From the perspective of tourism, it would appear that just as in the case of the mass shootings that occurred in Orlando, Florida, Las Vegas, London, Madrid, or Paris these horrific actions will have little to no

long-term effect on local tourism (Ryan 1993; Pizam 1999; Tarlow 2014). What is more important, an article published in Las Vegas Review Journal underlines this point: “Interviews with Billy Vassiliadis, R&R Partners’ CEO and the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority’s advertising consultant, and Sean Snaith, an economics professor at the University of Central Florida in Orlando, revealed some somewhat surprising conclusions: that the triple tragedies in all likelihood would not damage to Orlando tourism long-term.” (Las Vegas Review-Journal June 25, 2016) The reasoning behind this conclusion is:

- These events were random and most likely would not be repeated
- These events would not cause people (in the long run) to cancel travel plans
- In the case of Orlando, the nightclub was not in the heart of the tourist zone (Las Vegas Review-Journal, June 26, 2016)

History has proven these predictions to be correct. In fact, we may take view these predictions from the reverse and conclude that damage to a tourism industry occurs from this new form of stealth violence when:

- The public believes the act is repeatable rather than random
- The events are such that people begin to cancel future travel plans
- The action occurred in a frequently visited part of a locale

These incidents also serve to underline the fact that despite the collapse of the Islamic State (ISIS) acts of terror or hatred for the sake of hatred although different from traditionally classical acts of past terrorism are still very much with the tourism industry and that the industry dare not lower its guard merely due to the demise of ISIS.

Challenges to tourism due to the end of ISIS

A March 21st headline reads: “Caliphate Conquered: ISIS’ final stronghold liberated, marking the end of terror group’s bloody empire” (Fox News: March 21, 2009). Along

with the recent physical destruction of the Islamic State many of ISIS' fighters, or supporters, have scattered throughout the Middle Eastern regions or even the world. Although the western media and public have applauded the Islamic State's physical demise tourism scholars and professionals will need to ask if this demise might have unintended consequences not only in the fight against terrorism but also impact the tourism industry. Does ISIS' demise create new physical security, philosophical and moral problems, and political problems? In a post-ISIS world does the lack of physical borders translate into potential new forms of terrorism? Furthermore, are we speaking of ISIS' demise or merely the end of the organization's lack of geographical cohesion? If terrorism is as much an ideological illness as a political entity then its geographic demise may cause its believers to spread out across the world and create a whole new host of unintended consequences. Could ISIS fighters metastasize into small cells that spread across the western world and become a new threat to the west and the tourism industry? The possibility that the world's tourism industry may be facing a new set of terrorism challenges is seen in comments made by the United Kingdom's minister of state for the Middle East and North Africa: "Even as we see Daesh (ISIS) push back on the physical battlefield, we know that they will continue to pose a threat in the region. We also know that the battle of ideas is far from won, Daesh is still capable of inspiring people to carry out attacks in its name and, as such, it remains a serious global threat," (CNBC, November 22, 2017)

Tourism, being a major player in the world's economy has an interconnected relationship between what occurs in the world as a whole and within the tourism industry in particular (Somnez 1998; Enders & Sandler 1991; Frey 2004). Predicting these future trends is not easy and most scholars can do is create models based on historical data and then extrapolate from these models into the future. As any first-year student of statistics however knows: extrapolations are at best inaccurate and can lead to false conclusions (Tarlow 2014). Thus, there is no way to be 100% certain that what appears to be a future reality will occur. The best that thoughtful scholars of tourism science and tourism professionals can do is to analyze potential data, create multiple models, and then create reasonable policies based on their best theoretical analysis of the data (Tarlow 2014).

Future trends are difficult to predict and it is even more difficult to make predictions regarding the tourism industry. The tourism industry is not only dispersed throughout a nation or the world, having both international and local components, but it is also a composite industry. Numerous interconnected sub-industries compose the tourism industry with each component having its own security vulnerabilities. In reality, there is no single tourism industry but rather it is an industry without specific “borders” that functions as a composite of facts and perceptions, with each interlocking part influencing the “industry’s” other components (Tarlow 2018). The tourism industry is more a system than a single industry with numerous moving parts that must coordinate with each other in order for the industry to function. From a security perspective, the more complex the system the more vulnerable it is to outside negative invasive forces such as terrorism. Additionally, the tourism industry’s various components have each long been a magnet for terrorism. Terrorism has impacted or attacked such branches of the tourism industry as hotels, transportation hubs (airports, train stations), sporting and cultural events, and the cruise industry. Often when there are a terrorist attack against one the industry’s components, the attack’s aftermath is felt throughout the entire industry and the consequences, such as in the case of Egypt, may be long-lasting.

Terrorism against tourism has gone through multiple stages. Although we may classify these stages as those listed below, it would be a mistake to assume that with the dawn of one stage of terrorism, the previous stage disappears. Instead, we might view these stages as concurrent. Terrorist acts against tourism have a “cumulative” impact where one form of terrorism may build on a previous type adding additional challenges for tourism security professionals. We may classify these stages as:

- 1) Acts of single-individuals without an overall ideology. Examples are the skyjackings, especially to Cuba from the United States, especially from Cuba in the 1960s. These spontaneous skyjackings eventually became planned hijackings by groups with political motives as seen by Black September (1970), the murders committed at the Munich Olympics (1972), and the hijacking of the Air France plane to Entebbe (1976)

- 2) Organizational terrorism as seen by the September 2001 attacks by Al Qaeda
- 3) Lone actor, or small group “cell” or “boutique” terrorism based on common ideologies and often stemming from racial or religious hate of one group toward another. Often the terrorist feels his group to be rejected or persecuted by the terrorists’ victim(s)
- 4) Terrorism based on cyber attacks, artificial intelligence, or robotics

Tourism professionals will be forced to ask if:

- What consequences, if any, will the end of the physical Islamic State have on tourism?
- What might these consequences be?
- If there are consequences will these be long-term consequences?

By long-term consequences, we are referring to terrorist attacks causing a substantial downturn in that location’s tourism market rather than some form of short-term consequence from which the local industry recovers rapidly.

With the passing of ISIS, tourism professionals and scholars will need to ask additional questions such as:

- Will its fighters return to a more peaceful civilian life?
- Will these fighters fade into the general population or will they form stealth cells that lay in wait until they feel a particular moment is correct to strike?
- Will these “former” ISIS fighters maintain their ideological stance and become stealth terrorists who will pose new threats not only to the general public but also to the tourism industry in particular?
- Will terrorists ally themselves with existing hate groups?
- Will they use social media as a tool to promote its terrorism agenda?

Past repeated terrorist attacks have impacted the tourism industry. For example, Liz Aldrman, writing in the New York Times states: “The surge of (2016) attacks in Europe has raised questions over whether a potentially durable new threat to stability is settling in.

The political challenges for Europe's leaders are stark, and the impact on the region's economy may be just as profound." (Alderman, July 26, 2016).

It appears that with the demise of major terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, terrorist attacks have evolved from mass terrorism attacks developed with precise planning and expense to terrorism of a less expensive and boutique variety.

The attacks against the mosques located in New Zealand serve as an example of what we might call hate filled boutique terrorism. Although it appears that these attacks were hate-oriented crimes rather than acts of international terrorism, they can easily become a paradigm for "boutique" terrorism actions. Furthermore, the assumption that these attacks are carried out by "lone wolves" may result in both the public and scholars of terrorism overlooking interconnections between groups. Is terrorism still very much with us? Are its various metamorphoses merely results in misdiagnosing the problem? As Daniel I. Byman of the Brookings Institute has written: "Most troubling for the long term, the Islamic State has nurtured the flame of jihad around the world. Even as the group declines, the ideas it champions—the necessity of a caliphate, the glory of brutality and the evil of Western states—have spread further, as the staggering volume of foreign fighters suggests. The Islamic State's propaganda is extensive and almost ubiquitous. It, or would-be successor organizations, will try to harvest the ideas that the early Islamic State leaders planted." (Byman, 2019)

Byman notes that the post-ISIS threat is especially acute in Europe stating: "Internal dynamics make Europe a particularly likely target, and in the short term the terrorism threat may grow as the caliphate collapses. The Syrian conflict has attracted over six thousand European volunteers. Some of these European foreign fighters will die and some will stay in the war zone, but some will also likely return to their home countries. One EU official estimates that approximately 1,500 will return. A fraction of those who return home may commit terrorist attacks or recruit locals to join the cause." (Byman, 2019)

Byman's warning is echoed by the US Government's tourism safety website. Its 2019 updated noted that: "Terrorist groups including ISIS, al-Qa'ida (sic), their associates, and those inspired by such organizations, are intent on attacking U.S. citizens wherever they

are. Extremists might use conventional or non-conventional weapons to target U.S. government and private interests. Terrorists are increasingly using less sophisticated methods, including edged weapons, pistols and vehicles, as weapons to effectively target crowds. Extremists increasingly aim to identify and attack "soft" targets, such as:

- High-profile public events (sporting contests, political rallies, demonstrations, holiday events, celebratory gatherings, etc.)
- Hotels, clubs and restaurants
- Places of worship
- Educational institutions such as schools
- Parks
- Shopping malls and markets
- Tourism infrastructure and tourist sites
- Public transportation systems such as airports and railway stations ”

Some of these fighters originally came from Western nations, are both media savvy and knowledgeable of the West, and now with the demise of ISIS wish to return to those nations. Their potential return means new challenges and possible legal disputes for both Europe and the American governments. For example, a new United Kingdom law criminalizes accessing terrorism material. The law’s intent is to prevent the spread of ISIS style ideologies via social media. As the Soufan Center’s report, however, notes: “Legislations that criminalizes accessing certain kinds of information risks a chilling effect on legitimate research and analysis” (Interbrief, March 2019)

These former ISIS “warriors” possible return poses security, political and philosophical dilemmas not only for those nations’ governments but potentially also for the tourism industry. For example, both the United States and the United Kingdom have had to deal with the so-called “ISIS brides”. These are young women who left these western nations for Syria or Iraq, became “ISIS brides” and also pro-ISIS propagandists, and now with ISIS’ demise desire to return to the nations from which they came. It is not clear if these women still support the ideals of the Islamic State and as such might create new problems for the nations to which they wish to return. These women’s illegal involvement in terrorist groups has created a number of practical and theoretical questions: questions for

which politicians, ethicists, and academics must find adequate answers not as an academic exercise but rather as matters of life and death. Writing in the New York Times Rukmini Callimachi and Catherine Porter quote Seamus Hughes of The George Washington University stating: “Citing the many crimes committed by ISIS, Seamus Hughes, deputy director of the George Washington program, said there were “thousands of legitimate reasons to question the sincerity” of appeals like those of Ms Muthana and Ms Polman. “The foreign women of the Islamic State, while often reduced to simplistic narratives about ‘jihadi brides,’ ‘brainwashing’ and ‘online grooming,’ aided and abetted many of these atrocities and in some cases directly perpetrated them.” (New York Times, February 19, 2019)

On the other side of the debate we note that on Feb 16, 2019, President Trump tweeted: “The United States is asking Britain, France, Germany and other European allies to take back over 800 ISIS fighters that we captured in Syria and put them on trial. The Caliphate is ready to fall. The alternative is not a good one in that we will be forced to release them.....” (Trump tweet February 16, 2019). President Trump has indicated that he is fearful that if these fighters are not brought back to Europe then they may scatter and create new security problems throughout the world.

These decisions not only impact issues of international security and economic policy but also have a potentially profound impact on the tourism industry. Should these scattered former ISIS soldiers decide to create single-cell, or small cell, terrorist groups the potential for tourism security issues and loss of both life and money might become a major new hurdle for the tourism industry.

Antonia Ward of the Rand report writes concerning European nations: “RAND Europe and the European Parliament released a report in May on the cost of terrorism in the EU. Examining far more than direct costs, such as loss of life or damage to persons and infrastructure, the study also measured the indirect psychological impact on European citizens—people not involved in terrorist attacks, but suffering from anxiety and fear as a result—and its effects on GDP. It found that terrorism had a significant economic impact, costing Europe €180 million between 2004 and 2016.” (Ward, September 24, 2018) A 2018 CNN headline reads: ISIS goes global: 143 attacks in 29 countries have killed 2,043

{persons} and then states: “Since declaring its caliphate in June 2014, the self-proclaimed Islamic State has conducted or inspired more than 140 terrorist attacks in 29 countries other than Iraq and Syria, where its carnage has taken a much deadlier toll. Those attacks have killed at least 2,043 people and injured thousands more.” (CNN, Feb 12, 2018)

Analyzed from this perspective, the case of the ISIS brides becomes more complicated than merely a question of compassion, the potential repatriation of ISIS fighters and supporters leads to both legal and moral questions and the answers to these questions touches not only local populations but also the tourism industry. For example, are these “brides” still citizens of the countries they left behind? If so, are they now open to these nations’ laws of treason, and might enforcement of these laws possibly result in death? If they are accepted back into their former home nations, then in a non-sexist world must the west also accept the ISIS men? Nations both in Europe and in North America are then forced to ask: Should the nations of the world demonstrate compassion to those who were not compassionate to their enemies? The question also touches upon the issue of proportionality. Is there such a thing, in the case of terrorism, of “proportional” response and punishment or is this idea not only unworkable but also dangerous? Does the notion of proportionality lead to an Orwellian state of low-grade permanent war or a state of moral fairness with regards to punishments? David M. Crane, a professor at Syracuse University College of Law as stating: "Every nation has a right to defend its citizens," "but you must launch an attack in a proportional way and can't cause unnecessary suffering for civilians." (Tarlow, 2009) In the same article Michael Walter states: “Proportionality implies a measure, and the measure here is the value of the end-in-view. How many civilian deaths are "not disproportionate to" the value of defeating the Nazis? Answer that question, put that way, and you are likely to justify too much--and that is the way proportionality arguments have worked over most of their history.” (Tarlow. 2009)

The ISIS bride situation and that of returning ISIS fighters leaves political leaders with a political and philosophical quandary and forces the asking of questions such as:

- Does readmitting these fighters into Western societies pose a threat to these nation’s citizens?

- Is proportionality a valid method when fighting an absolute enemy?

There is a myriad of other questions concerning legal statuses. Are we only speaking about ISIS brides or are we speaking about hundreds and perhaps thousands of others who fought for ISIS? Are these “fighters” enemy-combatants or misguided misfits?

Even were we to leave the ISIS fighters out of our discussion for the time being and only concentrate on the “ISIS brides” there would still be numerous issues that must be faced. For example, in the case of Hoda Muthana, the legal issues are far from clear.

Although she was born in the United States, her father was a Yemeni diplomat who enjoyed diplomatic immunity. Being the daughter of a diplomat meant that she was a Yemeni citizen. Although she was born in the US, it is not clear if she is also an American citizen. If she is a foreign national, then Muthana is an enemy combatant, not entitled to US constitutional protection and might well be housed in the US military’s facilities in Guantanamo Bay. If she is a US citizen then there are unanswered questions concerning diplomatic extra-territoriality immunity and what that might mean for the world’s diplomats. This question poses a further dilemma, especially for many European and Latin American intellectuals. These intellectuals have strongly opposed the United States military’s facilities at Guantanamo Bay. Yet when faced with the dilemma that once an “ISIS bride” returns to European or American soil they face not only constitutional protections but also issues of being traitors, no one seems to have a functioning answer. Europe neither dares repatriate these people nor expel them. Much to the contrary, people such as Shamima Begum are being kept in a “political purgatory” with no physical solution. Does Europe need its own offshore facilities? Should European nations receive these “fighters” back as citizens and subject them to much harsher laws of treason?

Although it would appear that ISIS’ destruction has made the world a safer place, as any student of Newtonian physics knows, for every action, there is a counter, equal, or opposite reaction. Newton wrote from the perspective of physics. In physics, this principle is known as the “third law of thermodynamics. The 18th-century German philosopher Georg Hegel came to the same conclusions in his understanding of social

dynamics. Hegel wrote about what he called the dialectic of history, that is that historical events produce counter-events. Although the translation from these two philosophical positions to the world of politics is not exact, these basic principles remind us that often actions and events produce unintended counter actions or unforeseen consequences.

Thus, even as Western nations celebrate the end of one form of terrorism, ISIS' demise might also be provoking new challenges. Such new challenges might especially impact an industry such as the travel and tourism industry, and industry that is sensitive both to security issues and to terrorism. For example in an interview with Major General Felix Gedney, the deputy commander of the American led forces against ISIS in the British newspaper, *The Independent*, the newspaper notes: "He (Gedney) acknowledged that foreign fighters seeking to return to the West, including the UK, continue to pose a grave danger. Hundreds remain in Syria and Iraq, said Major Gen Gedney, the numbers of British citizens among them remain unclear. "We don't know the exact number from here; some who were UK citizens are no longer so because their citizenship has been revoked," he said. "But they are present and it is obviously a problem. It is not for me to say how we deal with them, but we do need to deal with them, otherwise, they would be after us again and try to carry out terrorist attacks." (Segupta: *The Independent*, September 12, 2018)

The tourism industry in a post-ISIS world

Few tourism professionals would disagree with the fact that crime, terrorism, and random acts of violence (CTRV) are cancers that gnaw at the very heart of the tourism industry. For example, Tarlow has written: "Questions of violence directly impact the tourism industry's ability to promote a safe and worry-free experience and can result in major economic losses. Vacationers have traditionally viewed their trips as an escape from the world's problems and from the worries of everyday life". (Tarlow, 2014)

For many years, however, much of the tourism industry ignored these issues. Tourism officials and marketers assumed that the less they addressed CTRV issues the better. These officials feared that even speaking about any form of tourism security would drive

customers away and thus, the less said the better! Many tourism professionals even avoided addressing tourism security and tourism safety issues altogether. As Tarlow has noted: “There has been a common feeling among these (tourism professionals) that visitors will wonder if too much security indicates that they should be afraid and that even speaking about these subjects will frighten customers.” (Tarlow: 2006) Especially in the years prior to 2001, the industry often took the position that the less said about tourism security and safety the better. In reality, nothing could have been further from the truth. Many of today's travelers and tourists, for the most part, seek out places where there is a sense of security and safety.

This basic fear, still expressed from time to time, was that an open discussion about CTRV issues would frighten visitors and result in a loss of revenue. Tourism scholars and academics, on the other hand, speak about the need for industry transparency and that without frank and open discussions regarding the issues of the day they cannot develop or hope to find solutions.

Furthermore, although there is a small minority of travelers who seek out the dangerous in tourism, most visitors want to know what the industry is doing to protect them, and how well prepared a local industry is in case a security or safety issue should occur.

What do we mean by security?

Many professionals view security as the protection against the unwanted action of a person or object: that is someone or something that causes intentional harm to another person. In contrast to security, many professionals have classically defined safety as protecting a person or people against involuntary unintended negative consequences. In today's world of biochemical or contagious disease hazards we must also consider the issue of health as an issue of safety/security that sits between these two poles. As the tourism industry has learned the fear of pandemics such as SARS or H1N1 (swine flu) can come close to destroying a local tourism industry even when the number of illness is minuscule. To distinguish between safety and security consider the case of a major fire.

If the fire came about due to being a case of arson then it is a security issue. On the other hand, was this same fire to have occurred due to an act of the weather or benign negligence, we would determine that this same fire was unintentional and therefore is safety rather than a security issue. Often because any of these issues, security, safety or health, can destroy a vacation many tourism officials use a composite category, “tourism surety”, to unite these diverse disciplines. In the case of the travel and tourism industry, both a safety and a security mishap can destroy not only a vacation but also part of or the entirety of a local tourism industry. We might define tourism surety as the point where safety, security, health, and economic viability intersect. Tourism and terrorism

Because tourism is such a vast industry and its economic footprint is felt throughout the world, what happens to the tourism industry is felt throughout world economies. The tourism industry has become a major battleground for CTRVs, and both criminals and terrorists have often targeted tourism sites. Especially in the area of terrorism, these sites often differ from each other not only in locations but also in their social, demographic and political composition. For example, there does not seem to be a relationship between the locale’s population size and acts of terrorism, nor its dominant religion, politics or wealth. Terrorism has occurred in both rural and urban settings. Here is a partial list of nations that have suffered from terrorist attacks that have impacted that nation’s tourism industry, either at the end of the twentieth century or in the twenty-first century.

- Argentina
- Australia
- Canada
- Bali
- Belgium
- Egypt
- France
- Indonesia
- Israel
- Kenya
- Mexico

- Morocco
- Pakistan
- Peru
- Thailand
- The Philippines
- The United Kingdom
- The United States

During the first fifth of the twenty-first century, high water marks for Al Qaeda's and the Caliphate, the tourism industry, and most political analysts assumed that the Middle East was the epicenter of world terrorism. Both scholars and policymakers were well aware that there were other parts of the world that also suffered from terrorism, but it was assumed that the Middle East was terrorism's breeding grounds. It was also assumed that many terrorists saw the tourism industry as rich in soft targets and therefore directed much of their activity against that industry. In analyzing terrorism stages we must be careful to understand that terrorism, like a medical virus, can mutate into new forms, while not necessarily abandoning its original forms. Put another way, terrorism, like an amoeba, subdivides, creating new offshoots while maintaining its central core.

To better understand this concept, it is easiest to divide terrorism into stages. It must be remembered, however, that one stage does not replace the former stage but merely adds to the terrorist "stew".

We may divide these concurrent stages as:

- Pre-September 11, 2001: In this stage, terrorism actions tended to be somewhat isolated with major attacks being against specific groups or of individuals hijacking airplanes, often from the United States to Cuba. Much of the world and the tourism industry saw terrorism as an annoyance rather than as a major threat. However, by the 1970s terrorists had skyjacked passenger aircraft for political reasons, and PLO terrorists skyjacked five airplanes to Jordan that was blown up. The 1970s also saw the skyjacking of the Air France plane to Entebbe, Uganda and the attack against the cruise ship the

Achille Lauro (Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training). By the end of the century, there were signs of mass terrorism century with countries such as Argentina, France, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States being victimized

- The first decades of the twenty-first century saw acts of mass terrorism especially in the west move to center stage. In this stage, terrorism was not only attacks on unarmed civilians but also the false threat of a terrorist attack, was a way to damage a location's economy or reputation. Major terrorist attacks occurred in the Americas, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Oceania.
- The second decade of the twenty-first century began to see what might be called "boutique terrorism". These were acts in which small cells and without a central command appeared to act on their own volition. Because these cells had an ideological rather than territorial or economic base they were difficult to pre-detect and often occurred in places that did not fit into the prior existing paradigms
- With the end of a coherent Islamic state, we need to question if we are entering into a new stage of terrorism in which former ISIS fighters scatter throughout the world, continue to maintain their ideological beliefs and become stealth fighters. These people might well connect especially with far-right extremist groups to form an almost undetectable and virulent strain of terrorism. The attacks against various houses of worship might be the first manifestations of this form of terrorism.

In this new form of terrorism, which may manifest itself in any tourism activities, traditional armies might be less necessary than well-trained tourism policing units. Major armaments might be useless when it comes to detecting and destroying urban-oriented ideologically driven former ISIS fighters. These will be soldiers who have faded into the general population, yet still, seek to create havoc. This point is underlined by the BBC quoting the United Nation's Secretary General when he stated: "IS (ISIS) militants are active in rural areas with remote, rugged, terrain that gives them the freedom to move and plan attacks...Cells are to be planning activities that undermine government authority, create an atmosphere of lawlessness, sabotage societal reconciliation and increase the cost of reconstruction and counter-terrorism" (Gutierrez, BBC March 23, 2019) Does the

Secretary General's report possibly mean that Europe could see a new flow of refugees? Is it possible that at least some of these new immigrants might take their ideology and personal hatreds with them forming new cells in their new lands of residence?

In facing this newest stage of terrorism, what we might call "stealth terrorism" to continue to be successful tourism destinations, tourism officials will need to collaborate with law enforcement agencies in "partnerships-for-safety."

These partnerships will have to be far-reaching. Even as short a time as twenty years ago, few tourism security scholars spent time thinking about such issues as cyber crime, the impact of robotics on tourism security and safety, the ability to close an airport with the use of drones or the delivery of mass murder through stealth delivery systems.

Reasons for terrorism

Tourism has long been a magnet for acts of terrorism. Although the strain of terrorism may mutate the reality that terrorism seeks the tourism industry's destruction has not changed. Below are some of the reasons that scholars cite for the tourism industry's components being such attractive targets for terrorists.

- Tourism is interconnected with transportation centers. For example, an attack on an airport not only hurts the tourism industry but also any other industry dependent on air transportation.
- Tourism is not merely big business but in many places, it is a mega business and terrorism seeks to conquer its enemies by destroying their economies.
- Tourism is interrelated with multiple other industries; thus an attack on the tourism industry may also wipe out a number of secondary industries.
- Tourism is highly media oriented and terrorism seeks publicity. An attack on a tourism installation such as a hotel or resort will attract a great deal of attention at a far lower cost than attacking a military base or foreign embassy.
- Most tourism locations are soft targets and rarely can the terrorist be stopped due to opposition gunfire. Terrorists tend to seek out places that are known as "gun free zones."

These are locations where terrorists believe their victims will be unarmed and incapable of self-defence.

- In most places, tourism officials have no idea what their customer's personal history might be. No one takes a personal history when renting a hotel room to a guest or selling a ticket to an amusement park. This means that tourism security officials must deal with large numbers of people about which they have no knowledge. From this perspective, tourism security officials are at a major disadvantage and must assume that all customers are potential terrorists while at the same time offering good customer service.

- The tourism industry promotes national and religious icons. These are major attractions but also can serve as magnets for terrorists seeking mass killings or publicity.

In the early years after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States scholars believed that the following criteria acted as potential magnets for terrorism.

- Potential for mass casualties
- Potential for economic damage
- Major media sites or newsworthy locations
- The hosting of a major icon, such as the Statue of Liberty in New York harbor or Corcovado (Christ the Redeemer Statue) In Rio de Janeiro.

Some twenty years have now passed since the September 11th attacks and history has proven that these factors are not the sole predictors or even the correct predictors for acts of terrorism. Globalization means that many organizations now work in an interconnected world. The European Union's no border policy between member states means that not only can travelers and tourists freely go from one nation to another but also the same is also true of terrorists. CTRV acts have occurred in a wide variety of locations. Due to the advent of social media, a telephone with a camera may be as powerful as an entire camera crew and the entire earth is now one major media site.

These tourism locations have nothing more in common with each other than being the site of a successful tourism industry. As noted above tourism scholars and professionals have wondered what attracts terrorism to tourism. In reality, after twenty years of studying the subject we have had to conclude that just as in the case of a virus, terrorism continues to

mutate. What appeared to be true two decades ago is not necessarily true as we begin the third decade of the twenty-first century. Tourism professionals and scholars will then have to wonder if headlines such as: “Caliphate Conquered: „,ISIS’ final stronghold liberated, marking the end of terror groups bloody empire” (Fox News website: March 21, 2019) not only is a reason for celebration but also an indication that a new strain of terrorism may soon occur.

Twenty years ago, it was clear to most professionals that there was a difference between terrorism and crimes against tourists. Criminals had a parasitic relationship with tourism. For example, criminals needed successful tourism festivals or crowds if they succeeded in pickpocketing visitors. On the other hand, it was believed that terrorists were not interested in making money from the tourism industry but rather sought to destroy the industry in order to inflict economic damage and chaos into a society. Twenty years later the world has changed. Illegal drugs, illegal cross border migrations, and sex trafficking are all confounding elements. In this new scenario, terrorists entered into the illegal drug trade, or sex trafficking trade, as a way to earn money for their acts of terrorism. Furthermore, in a borderless world it is much more difficult to track a terrorist’s activities and what might appear to be a victimless crime might well be the cover for an act of terrorism.

A perfect example of this is found in a hypothesis put forward by the Soufan Center Intelbrief Newsletter. The center postulates that the attacks in New Zealand may be manifestations of collaboration between various ultra-nationalist white supremacy paramilitary groupings such as the Ukrainian Azov Battalion. This battalion often recruits from dispersing places such as the United States, Scandinavia, Brazil and Germany. According to the newsletter: “operatives (from the Azov Battalion) outreach office traveled around Europe to promote the organization and proselytize its mission of white supremacy. In July 2018, German-language fliers were distributed among the visitors at a right-wing rock festival in Thuringia, inviting them to be part of the Azov battalion: ‘join the ranks of the best’ to “save Europe from destruction” The newsletter continues by stating that in a globalized world, ”It is now evident that RWE (right-wing extremists) networks are also highly active in recruiting fighters worldwide to its cause with the Azov

battalion and other ultra-nationalist organizations playing a significant role in the globalization of RWE violence” (The Soufan Center Intelbrief, March 22, 2019).

It may be too early to determine the accuracy of this hypothesis, but if true and if the returning fighters from ISIS merge with RWE groups then the world, including the tourism industry may be facing a new and deadly challenge

The role of tourism policing in the post-ISIS age:

One of the realities of this stealth tourism is that large scale military forces might be less valuable than well-trained tourism policing. To meet these new challenges tourism policing will have to change to match and counterbalance the changes occurring within the world of terrorism. Tourism police will have to learn to protect the visitor and the visitor industry from digital warfare and be prepared to act in an interconnected world. In a like manner, as robotics now allows tourism entities to save on manpower, the same might be true for terrorist organizations that use highly well-trained personnel coupled with technological advances. The question that must be answered is if the post-ISIS/Caliphate world of tourism security will necessarily be different. If history is a guide we may assume that terrorism will continue to exist and that “human nature creates a dichotomy. We seek to know the unknown but fear the unknown; we seek both safety and security but are “animals” both capable and willing to take risks. We fear domination and loss of self, but there is a violent streak in humanity that provokes violence and the desire to conquer, enslave, or destroy the other.” (Tarlow, 2019) Peter De Wilde, president of the European Travel Commission summarizes these issues when he stated: “Terrorism activity in continental Europe has led policy-makers to focus on enhanced security measures at the expense of freedom to travel; and proposals to further liberalize travel within the Schengen Area have been put on ice. But this is the wrong choice for governments to make. In view of the above, you might even call it a short-sighted and therefore immoral choice.”

Conclusions

History is a look back and never forward, but often lessons from the past can help us avoid the same mistakes in the future. With history as our guide, we know that ever since Cain murdered Abel human beings have had a violent streak. We also know that the highly globalized and interconnected world filled with technology means that communication is not only easier for the traveler but also for those who seek to destroy the tourism and travel industry. Modernity means not only great opportunities for peace but also as we learned in World War II, enhanced opportunities for human destruction. Tourism in a post-ISIS world will need not only highly skilled professionals but the realization that we are once again faced with the challenge first put forth by Moses as the Children of Israel finished their journey to the promised land: Behold I put before you both life and death, choose life! It will be our responsibility to make the correct choice and to choose life over acts of terrorism.

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